[3] Hunt, G., et al. (2018). Zircon: The kernel of Fuchsia. Google Technical Report .
A driver receives a memory capability for its DMA buffer but cannot access physical memory outside that range. The kernel validates every access via capability tables stored in protected address space. kernel os 10
Author: Academic Research Unit Publication Date: April 2026 Abstract The evolution of operating system kernels has oscillated between monolithic, hybrid, and microkernel architectures. Kernel OS 10 represents the tenth iteration of a capability-based microkernel designed from the ground up for security, modularity, and real-time performance. This paper presents the architectural principles, system call interface, inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms, memory management, driver isolation, and formal verification methods employed in Kernel OS 10. Empirical benchmarks demonstrate that Kernel OS 10 achieves near-monolithic performance while providing strong isolation guarantees. We conclude that microkernels have matured into viable candidates for safety-critical and general-purpose computing. [3] Hunt, G
[4] Rushby, J. (1981). Design and verification of secure systems. SOSP ‘81 . Google Technical Report
Microkernel, capability-based security, IPC, formal verification, seL4, OS architecture. 1. Introduction Monolithic kernels (Linux, Windows NT) dominate general-purpose computing due to performance advantages from shared address spaces. However, device driver bugs—the primary source of OS crashes—can corrupt kernel memory, compromising entire systems. Microkernels minimize trusted computing base (TCB) by running most services (drivers, file systems, network stacks) as user-space processes.
[2] Klein, G., et al. (2009). seL4: Formal verification of an OS kernel. SOSP ‘09 .